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Abstract  Using  a  two-period  tax-signalling  model,  a  study  is  performed  on  the  behaviour  of  a
revenue-raising  government  in  setting  proﬁt-based  corporate  taxes  for  a  company  with  private
information  on  its  potential  proﬁtability.  In  a  separating  equilibrium  in  which  both  the  high-  and
low-proﬁt company  produce  a  positive  amount  in  period  1  (separating  equilibrium  S2),  the  tax
set for  that  period  is  lower  than  that  of  the  symmetric  information,  resulting  in  informational
rent to  the  high-proﬁt  company  in  that  period,  but  not  in  period  2.  As  result,  taxes  increase  with
time. In  a  separating  equilibrium  in  which  only  the  high-proﬁt  company  produces  (separating
equilibrium  S1  or  shut-down  equilibrium),  no  informational  rent  goes  to  the  high-proﬁt  company
in either  period,  but  at  the  cost  that  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  exits  the  market.  Finally,  in  a  pooling
equilibrium,  taxes  are  time-invariant  and  charged  in  such  a  way  that  period-1  informational
rent to  the  high-proﬁt  company  is  lower  than  in  S2,  but  persists  in  period  2.  Consequently,  the
government  can  maximize  tax  revenue  by  not  forcing  information  disclosure.  The  impact  of
government  behaviour  on  welfare  is  also  examined.
© 2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  All  rights
reserved.
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Resumen  Este  artículo  examina,  a  través  de  un  modelo  de  sen˜alización  de  dos  períodos,  el
comportamiento  de  un  gobierno  recaudatorio  a  la  hora  de  ﬁjar  el  impuesto  de  sociedades  a  unaImpuestos
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empresa  con  información  privada  sobre  su  potencial  de  rentabilidad.  En  un  equilibrio  separador
en el  que  tanto  la  empresa  muy  rentable  como  la  poco  rentable  producen  una  cantidad  positiva
en el  periodo  1  (equilibrio  separador  S2),  el  impuesto  ﬁjado  para  dicho  período  es  inferior  al  de
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estas  rentas  desaparecen  en  el  periodo  2.  Como  resultado,  el  impuesto  crece  con  el  tiempo.  En
un equilibrio  separador  en  el  que  solo  la  empresa  rentable  produce  (equilibrio  separador  S1),  el
gobierno ahorra  cualquier  renta  informacional  a  esta  empresa  en  ambos  periodos,  pero  a  costa
de que  la  empresa  poco  rentable  salga  del  mercado.  Por  último,  en  un  equilibrio  agrupador,  el
impuesto es  invariante  en  el  tiempo  y  ﬁjado  de  forma  que  la  renta  informacional  de  la  empresa
rentable  en  el  período  1  es  menor  que  en  S2,  pero  persiste  en  el  periodo  2.  En  consecuencia,
el gobierno  puede  maximizar  los  ingresos  ﬁscales  no  forzando  la  divulgación  de  información.
También  se  examina  el  impacto  que  la  citada  conducta  del  gobierno  tiene  en  el  bienestar.
© 2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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u1. Introduction
In  most  economies,  tax  revenues  provide  a  substantial  por-
tion  of  funds  aimed  at  ﬁnancing  public  services  or  enabling
governments  to  redistribute  resources.  Firms  contribute
to  tax  revenues  through  input,  output  and  proﬁt  taxes.
In  fact,  the  direct  taxation  of  businesses  is  a  widespread
practice  worldwide.  Since  ﬁrms  are  legal  entities  separate
from  their  owners,  the  justiﬁcation  for  this  corporate  tax
remains  rather  unclear,  as  the  government  could  just  as
easily  directly  tax  owners  by  means  of  an  income  tax.  The
literature  on  public  ﬁnance  describes  three  potential  justi-
ﬁcations  for  taxing  corporate  gains.  First,  a  corporate  tax  as
a  tax  on  pure  proﬁts  causes  less  distortion.  Second,  since
corporate  status  provides  protection  in  bankruptcy  situa-
tions  it  seems  reasonable  to  pay  for  this  privilege  that  is  not
available  to  individuals.  Finally,  myopic  owners  who  do  not
perceive  themselves  as  paying  the  corporate  tax  will  more
readily  accept  this  tax  than  an  income  tax;  therefore,  if  the
government  wants  to  maximize  votes,  it  will  tend  to  set  a
corporate  tax  (Bachetta  and  Caminal,  1991).
The  fact  remains  that  governments  tax  businesses.  Taken
together,  personal  and  corporate  income  taxes  are  the  most
important  sources  of  revenues  for  public  spending  in  almost
half  of  all  OECD  countries  (OECD,  2012),  and  even  though
personal  income  taxes  typically  represent  the  largest  por-
tion  of  total  tax  revenues,  corporate  taxes  are  also  an
important  source.  According  to  OECD  data,  in  2010  the  cor-
porate  share  of  tax  revenues  was  around  10%  on  average,
although  with  wide  variations  across  countries,  from  a  low
of  3%  in  Iceland  and  Hungary  to  a  high  of  24%  in  Norway,
with  rates  for  Germany,  France,  the  UK,  the  USA  and  Aus-
tralia  applied  at  4.2%,  6%,  8.8%,  10.8%  and  19%,  respectively.
(See  also  Devereux  et  al.  [2002]  and  Devereux  [2012],  among
others.)
Apart  from  other  factors,  a  government’s  ability  to
obtain  more  or  less  corporate  tax  revenues  relies  on  ﬁrms’
behaviour  regarding  correct  reporting  of  earnings.  In  a
context  of  perfect  information,  the  government  is  obvi-
ously  in  the  best  position  to  optimally  calibrate  corporate
taxes  according  to  a  ﬁrm’s  proﬁts.  However,  it  is  more
logical  to  assume  that  the  government  has----at  least  in
some  periods----less  information  on  the  ﬁrm’s  proﬁts  or
entrepreneurial  ability  than  ﬁrms  themselves,  and,  conse-
quently,  on  tax-paying  capacity.  Therefore,  a  government
t
t
t
dilemma  is  determining  whether  information  disclosure  by
rms  is  preferable  to  non-disclosure.
As  Klinger  and  McFate  (2013)  argue  corporate  tax  disclo-
ure  has  grown  increasingly  opaque.  A  decade  ago,  the  SEC
mposed  uniform  disclosure  standards  for  executive  compen-
ation.  As  result,  all  public  companies  report  the  same  CEO
ay  data  in  a  common  format,  making  comparisons  of  one
rm  to  another  both  easy  and  straightforward.  In  contrast,
orporate  tax  disclosure  has  no  uniformity.  Corporations
resent  rudimentary  information  on  the  taxes  they  expect
o  pay  in  a  given  year,  but  many  are  quick  to  complain  that
hese  are  not  the  ‘‘real  numbers’’  when  they  are  cited  in
he  media.  Corporations  should  disclose  how  much  they  pay
n  income  taxes  and  to  whom  those  taxes  are  paid.
Put  differently,  improved  tax  disclosure  would  help  pol-
cymakers  and  tax  collectors  to  see  which  corporations  are
eporting  billions  of  dollars  of  proﬁts  in  small  tax  haven
ountries  where  they  have  no  sales,  employees,  or  physical
ssets.  The  magnitude  of  offshore  tax  abuse  would  be  plain
o  see  and  create  the  political  will  to  address  the  problem
Klinger  and  McFate,  2013, p.  18).
This  paper  develops  a  simple  model  of  asymmetric
nformation  with  adverse  selection  that  considers  a  revenue-
aising  government  and  a  single  ﬁrm  that  can  be  either
igh-proﬁt  or  low-proﬁt.  The  government  wants  to  set  a  tax
n  proﬁts  in  two  periods  in  such  a  way  as  to  maximize  its  rev-
nue.  The  ﬁrm  has  private  information  concerning  its  proﬁt
otential  (high  or  low),  whereas  the  government  can  only
ake  a  prior  probability  assessment.  A  two-period  model  is
eveloped  in  which  the  ﬁrm’s  period-1  output  may  trans-
it  (or  not)  information  to  the  government  concerning  ﬁrm
roﬁtability.
Entrepreneurial  ability  is  an  unobservable  input  that
annot  be  directly  taxed  (Moresi,  1998). Output,  however,
s  publicly  observable  and  enables  the  government  to  infer
or  not)  the  ﬁrm’s  proﬁts.  In  this  context,  the  high-proﬁt
rm  would  like  to  hide  its  private  information  and  convince
he  government  that  it  is  a  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  and  so  pay
ower  taxes.  For  reported  output  to  be  a  credible  signal
f  low  proﬁt  there  must  be  a  cost  associated  with  output
nder-reporting.  The  model  developed  below  addresses
he  following  issues:  How  should  the  government  tax  ﬁrms
o  maximize  tax  revenues?  Does  the  government  prefer
o  induce  the  taxed  ﬁrm  to  disclose  its  information?  How
oes  optimal  taxation  affect  social  welfare?  Under  what
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onditions  is  government’s  behaviour  socially  optimal?
eal-life  taxation  situations  seem  quite  similar  to  the
imple  framework  described  here.
The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  show  that  the
overnment  faces  a  trade-off  when  setting  corporate  taxes
nder  asymmetric  information.  On  one  hand,  by  observ-
ng  the  ﬁrm’s  output  in  period  1  (in  a  perfect  Bayesian
eparating  equilibrium),  it  can  elicit  information  on  the
rm’s  tax-paying  potential.1 In  this  case,  it  needs  to  offer
n  incentive  to  the  taxed  ﬁrm  to  fully  disclose  its  private
nformation,  resulting  in  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  obtaining  an
nformational  rent  in  period  1.  On  the  other  hand,  the  gov-
rnment  need  not  grant  any  informational  rent  in  period  2
ecause  complete  information  is  restored  for  this  period.
he  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  will  want  to  reduce  the  informational
ontent  of  its  output  report  to  increase  the  probability  that
t  is  perceived  as  a  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm.  Conversely,  a  low-proﬁt
rm  will  want  to  enhance  the  informational  content  of  its
utput  report  to  ensure  that  the  payable  tax  coincides  more
losely  with  the  tax  corresponding  to  complete  informa-
ion.  Derived  thus  is  the  separating  equilibrium  (S2)  for  the
wo-period  tax-signalling  game  in  which  both  ﬁrm  types  are
roducing,  with  the  result  that  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  must
istort  its  period-1  output  below  the  complete-information
roﬁt-maximizing  level  to  convince  the  government  that  it
s  genuinely  low-proﬁt.  The  optimal  period-1  tax  for  the  gov-
rnment  is  consequently  lower  in  the  presence  than  in  the
bsence  of  signalling,  and  such  tax  is  time-increasing.
Alternatively  the  government  can  opt  to  elicit  the  ﬁrm’s
nformation  by  observing  its  period-1  output  and,  further,  by
reventing  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  from  obtaining  informational
ent  in  either  period.  This  is  separating  equilibrium  S1  or
hut-down  equilibrium,  in  which  the  cost  to  the  government
f  not  granting  informational  rent  to  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  is
hat  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  does  not  produce  at  all.
Yet  another  alternative  is  for  the  government  to  refuse  to
pdate  its  ﬁrm-type  information  and  allow  both  ﬁrm  types
o  produce.  This  is  a  pooling  equilibrium,  in  which  both  ﬁrm
ypes  produce  the  same  output  in  period  1.  The  informa-
ional  rent  that  the  government  grants  to  the  high-proﬁt
rm  in  this  period  is  lower  than  in  S2,  but  unlike  in  S2,  this
ent  persists  in  period  2.
In  S2  equilibrium  of  the  game,  the  government  sets
eriod-1  tax  for  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  in  such  a  way  that
nformational  rent  is  sufﬁciently  large  for  this  ﬁrm  not
o  misrepresent  itself.  This  rent  is,  however,  restricted  to
eriod  1,  that  is,  informational  rent  no  longer  holds  in  period
.  In  S1  equilibrium,  the  government  also  identiﬁes  the  ﬁrm
ype  but  provides  no  informational  rent  to  the  high-proﬁt
rm,  although  at  the  cost  of  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  exiting  the
arket.  In  pooling  equilibrium,  the  government  gives  less
nformational  rent  in  period  1  to  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  than  in
2,  but,  unlike  in  S2,  this  rent  persists  in  period  2.
In  general,  the  government  prefers  ﬁrms  to  disclose  their
bility  to  make  (more  or  less)  proﬁts,  because  disclosure
1 An equilibrium is said to be perfectly informative if it commu-
icates the ﬁrm’s type with probability 1 on the (period-1) output
eport date. Contrariwise, an uninformative equilibrium is deﬁned
s an equilibrium in which the government cannot use reported
period-1) output to update its prior assessment of the ﬁrm’s type.
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esults  in  higher  tax  revenue  than  non-disclosure.  In  par-
icular,  if  the  ratio  of  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms  is  small  enough,
he  pooling  equilibrium  outcome  is  the  best  option  for  the
overnment,  even  though  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  obtains  an
nformational  rent  in  both  periods  (higher  in  period  2 than  in
eriod  1).  If  the  ratio  of  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms  is  moderate,  given
he  level  of  efﬁciency  of  low-proﬁt  ﬁrms,  the  government
refers  to  impose  S2,  with  the  result  that  informational  rent
o  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  is  higher  than  in  pooling  equilibrium,
ut  is  only  granted  in  period  1.  Finally,  if  the  ratio  of  high-
roﬁt  ﬁrms  is  high  enough,  informational  rent  to  the  high-
roﬁt  ﬁrm  would  be  so  large  (both  in  pooling  equilibrium  and
2)  that  the  government  would  prefer  to  impose  separation
y  ensuring  that  only  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  produces  and  that
t  obtains  no  informational  rent  in  either  period.
The  intuition  behind  this  result  is  as  follows.  In  a  symmet-
ic  information  context,  this  (lump-sum)  tax  does  not  distort
he  ﬁrm’s  behaviour  (Atkinson  and  Stiglitz,  1980).  However,
n  an  asymmetric  information  context  even  a  lump-sum  tax
s  corporation  tax  can  be  distorting.  And  the  aim  of  the
overnment  wishing  to  maximize  revenues  is  to  reduce  dis-
ortion  as  much  as  possible.  Thus,  when  there  is  a  small  ratio
f  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms,  the  government  prefers  not  to  distort
he  period-1  output  of  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  but  to  distort  that
f  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  because,  in  this  way,  it  reduces  the
nformational  rent  granted  to  the  latter.  In  fact,  the  ratio
f  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms  is  so  small  as  to  result  in  a  small  infor-
ational  rent  in  expected  terms.  However,  when  there  is  a
oderate  ratio  of  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms,  the  government  prefers
isclosure  to  hold  even  if  this  results  in  some  distortion  for
he  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  in  period  1.  Consequently,  period-1  infor-
ational  rent  for  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  is  increased  relative  to
he  pooling  equilibrium  situation  and,  in  return,  neither  ﬁrm
btains  informational  rent  in  period  2.  Finally,  when  there  is
 very  high  ratio  of  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms,  the  optimal  behaviour
or  the  government  is  to  assume  that  the  ﬁrm  has  a  high
ax-paying  potential.  In  this  case,  it  renounces  revenues  if
he  ﬁrm  is,  in  fact,  low-proﬁt  (a  rather  unlikely  scenario),
ut  instead  fully  eliminates  the  informational  rent  to  the
igh-proﬁt  ﬁrm.
From  a  social  standpoint,  the  incentives  of  a  govern-
ent  that  sets  corporate  taxes  to  maximize  tax  revenue  are
ot  generally  aligned  with  social  incentives.  Inducing  disclo-
ure  generally  maximizes  social  welfare:  aggregate  welfare
s  only  maximized  when  the  government  opts  for  pooling
quilibrium  and  in  a  small  region  where  S2  holds.  Otherwise
overnment  incentives  are  not  aligned  with  social  incen-
ives.  From  a  social  perspective,  for  example,  when  the
overnment  imposes  S2,  pooling  equilibrium  is  socially  opti-
al,  and  when  the  government  imposes  S1,  S2  is  socially
ptimal.
For  an  environment  in  which  entrepreneurs  chose
etween  risky  projects  (higher  potential  proﬁts)  and  safe
rojects  (lower  potential  proﬁts),  Becker  and  Fuest  (2007)
xamined  the  relationship  between  limited  liability  and
orporate  taxation,  showing  that  a  corporate  tax  on
ll  entrepreneurs  with  limited  liability  is  optimal  when
ntrepreneurs  can  offset  potential  losses  in  a  situation  of
symmetric  information  concerning  project  qualities.  For  a
imilar  context,  Miglo  (2007)  conﬁrmed  that  entrepreneurs’
bility  to  offset  losses  and  the  presence  of  asymmetric  infor-
ation  may  affect  tax  policy,  although  the  optimal  taxation
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policy  differed  from  that  suggested  by  Becker  and  Fuest
(2007).
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  into  ﬁve  sec-
tions.  Section  2  outlines  the  model.  Section  3  derives,  as
a  benchmark,  taxation  on  proﬁts  under  symmetric  infor-
mation.  Section  4  analyses  the  optimal  taxation  strategy
under  asymmetric  information  and  discusses  the  correspond-
ing  distortions  in  government  and  ﬁrm  behaviours.  Section  5
examines  the  welfare  implications  of  government  behaviour.
Finally,  Section  6  concludes  the  paper.
2. The model
An  economy  with  a  revenue-raising  government  that  charges
corporate  tax  to  a  ﬁrm  over  two  periods  is  considered.  Firm
activity  is  restricted  to  this  single  country,2 and  corporate
tax  amounts  to  100%  of  capital  gains.  Assumptions  are  as
described  as  follows.
Assumption  1.  The  taxed  ﬁrm  faces  linear  market  demand
pt(qt)  =  1  −  qt in  each  period  t,  t  =  1,  2,  for  qt <  1  and
pt(qt)  =  0  for  qt ≥  1,  where  pt denotes  unit  price  in  period
t  when  qt units  of  the  good  are  sold.  (1  denotes  the  market
parameter.)
Asymmetric  information  is  characterized  by  the  following
assumption:
Assumption  2.  The  distribution  for  the  ﬁrm’s  proﬁt  is  com-
mon  knowledge,  but  only  the  ﬁrm  knows  its  potential  proﬁt.
That  is,  the  ﬁrm  privately  knows  whether  its  potential
proﬁtability  is  high  or  low  (i.e.,  whether  its  potential  to
pay  taxes  is  high  or  low)  because,  better  than  the  govern-
ment,  it  knows  the  demand  level  and  its  own  efﬁciency  level.
Two  possible  proﬁtability  values  derive  from  the  following
assumption:
Assumption  3.  The  intercept  term  for  the  demand
described  in  Assumption  1,  net  of  costs,  can  take  one  of  two
values,  1  and  1  −  c,  with  0  <  c  <  1,  depending  on  whether
the  ﬁrm’s  marginal  production  cost  is  either  low  (equal  to
zero)  or  high  (c  >  0).
The  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  and  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  are  labelled  H  and
L,  respectively.  Proﬁt  levels  over  two  periods  are  the  same.
Assumption  4.  The  prior  probability  assessment  of  a  high-
proﬁt  ﬁrm  is  ,  0  <    <  1.
The  only  information  available  to  the  government  at  the
beginning  of  the  game  is  the  probability  of  a  ﬁrm  being  high
proﬁt  or  low  proﬁt.  However,  the  ﬁrm’s  potential  to  pay
taxes  may  be  then  inferred  by  the  government  (in  a  per-
fect  Bayesian  separating  equilibrium)  or  not  (in  a  perfect
Bayesian  pooling  equilibrium)  after  observing  the  output
produced  by  the  ﬁrm  in  period  1.
2 If the ﬁrm produced in the country as well as in other countries,
we would need to weight reported proﬁts by the country sales to
total sales to approximate the proﬁt generated in the country.
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Finally,  the  discount  factor  between  periods  is  assumed
o  be  1,  all  players  are  assumed  to  be  risk-neutral3 and  the
overnment  is  assumed  to  seek  to  maximize  tax  revenue
hroughout  both  periods  of  the  tax  game.
.  Symmetric information
n  a  symmetric  information  scenario,  all  players  are  assumed
o  know  the  ﬁrm’s  potential  to  pay  taxes,  in  which  case  the
ax  game  proceeds  as  follows.
eriod  1.  At  the  beginning  of  period  1,  Nature  chooses
he  ﬁrm’s  ability  to  make  proﬁts  and  this  ability  is  publicly
bservable.  For  this  period,  the  ﬁrm  pays  (lump-sum)  corpo-
ate  tax  T∗1k
4 as  a  function  of  type  k,  k  ∈  {H,L}  and  produces
utput  level  q∗1k.
eriod  2.  Corporate  tax  and  output  in  period  2  are  the
ame  as  for  period  1,  namely  T∗2k =  T∗1k and  q∗2k =  q∗1k.
In  this  context,  the  following  result  is  achieved.
emma  1.  Under  incomplete  but  symmetric  information,
n  each  period  t,  t  =  1,  2,  the  government  sets  corporate  tax
∗
tH =  1/4  for  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  and  T∗tL =  (1  −  c)2/4  for  the
ow-proﬁt  ﬁrm.
In  expected  terms,  the  tax  paid  by  the  ﬁrm  in  each
eriod  t  amounts  to  T∗t =  [1  −  (1  −  )(2  −  c)c]/4,  t  =  1,  2,
nd  decreases  as  the  probability  of  the  ﬁrm  being  high-proﬁt
ype  increases  and/or  as  the  disparity  between  proﬁts  for
oth  types  of  ﬁrm  increases.  The  ﬁrm’s  equilibrium  output
n  each  period  amounts  to  1/2  when  the  ﬁrm  is  H  and  to
1  −  c)/2  if  it  is  L.  Governmental  revenues  over  both  peri-
ds  are  1/2  for  the  ﬁrm  if  it  is  H,  and  (1  −  c)2/2  if  it  is
.  The  government’s  expected  revenue  over  both  periods
hus  amounts  to  R∗ =  2T∗t ,  i.e.,  the  government  obtains  the
rm’s  whole  per-period  proﬁt.  Needless  to  say,  the  presence
f  (lump-sum)  taxes  does  not  in  any  way  distort  the  ﬁrm’s
ehaviour  under  symmetric  information.  However,  this  sit-
ation  no  longer  holds  when  information  is  asymmetric.  In
his  case,  taxes  will  distort  ﬁrm  behaviour,  despite  of  the
act  that  such  taxes  are  lump-sum.
.  Asymmetric information
e  now  return  to  the  original  context,  where  information  is
symmetric.  A  ﬁrm  that  is  better  informed  than  the  govern-
ent  concerning  its  tax-paying  potential  will  try  to  beneﬁt
rom  this  advantage  by  representing  itself  as  a  ﬁrm  with  low
ax-paying  potential.  This  incentive  derives  from  the  fact
hat  the  corporate  tax  set  by  the  government  for  period
----when  it  believes  the  ﬁrm  is  low-proﬁt----is  lower  than
he  tax  set  when  the  government  believes  that  the  ﬁrm  is
igh-proﬁt.  In  a  separating  Bayesian  equilibrium----where  the
overnment  infers  type  from  observing  period-1  output----the
overnment  will  try  to  mitigate  opportunism  by  setting  a
3 Risk neutrality is a standard assumption for models of this type.
4 Asterisk denotes symmetric information.
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eriod-1  tax  for  that  induces  the  ﬁrm  to  disclose  the  kind  of
rivate  information  that  would  enable  better  calibration  of
eriod-2  tax.  Conversely,  in  a  pooling  Bayesian  equilibrium
he  government  would  be  unable  to  update  its  prior  proba-
ility  assessment  concerning  ﬁrm  type  from  period-1  output;
ence,  tax  in  period  2  would  be  the  same  as  in  period  1.
.1.  Perfect  Bayesian  separating  equilibrium
he  tax  game  when  separating  equilibrium  holds  unfolds  as
ollows.
eriod  1.  At  the  beginning  of  period  1,  the  government
nnounces  and  commits  to  period-1  corporate  tax  TS1 (super-
cript  S  denotes  separation)  for  the  ﬁrm,  given  some  prior
robability  assessment  that  the  ﬁrm  is  high-proﬁt.  At  this
tage,  the  ﬁrm  knows  its  tax-paying  potential,  whereas  the
overnment  only  has  imprecise  information.  However,  the
istribution  of  ﬁrm  type  is  common  knowledge.  The  ﬁrm
hooses,  in  period  1,  an  output  level  according  to  its  type
nd  the  impact  of  its  output  on  updated  beliefs.  Given  the
rior  probability  assessment  that  the  ﬁrm  is  high-proﬁt  and
hat  tax  is  TS1 ,  the  ﬁrm  chooses  period  1  output  to  maximize
roﬁt.  At  the  end  of  this  period,  the  government  observes
eriod-1  output  and  uses  this  information  to  update  its  prob-
bility  assessment  regarding  the  ﬁrm’s  tax-paying  potential.
eriod  2.  At  the  beginning  of  period  2  (when  complete
nformation  has  been  restored),  given  its  updated  proba-
ility  assessment,  the  government  announces  and  commits
o  period-2  corporate  tax  T∗2k,  this  time  different  for  each
rm  type  and  equal  to  that  set  in  conditions  of  symmetric
nformation.  Given  this  tax  and  the  government’s  updated
robability  assessment,  the  ﬁrm  chooses  period-2  output  to
aximize  proﬁts,  and  the  game  ends.
Sought  as  a  solution  for  this  tax  game  is  the  separating
ure-strategy  perfect  Bayesian-Nash  equilibrium.  Compar-
ng  the  period-2  net  proﬁts  of  each  ﬁrm  type  in  the
quilibrium  and  off-equilibrium  paths,  the  ﬁrm  is  found  to
e  interested  in  being  perceived  as  low-proﬁt  by  the  gov-
rnment.
In  period  1  the  government  cannot  distinguish  one  ﬁrm
ype  from  another,  so  the  tax  charged  in  this  period  must  be
he  same  for  both.  However,  separating  equilibrium  implies
hat  the  output  for  each  ﬁrm  type  in  this  period  will  be
ifferent.  Thus,  the  government  will  update  its  prior  prob-
bility  assessment  after  it  observes  period-1  output  and
etects  the  true  ﬁrm  type.  In  these  circumstances,  the  best
he  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  can  do  in  period  1  is  to  produce  the
utput  level  of  a  myopic  proﬁt-maximizing  monopolist,  i.e.,
m
1H =
1
2
(1)
the  m  superscript  stands  for  myopic  monopolistic
ehaviour),  who  makes  the  corresponding  gross  proﬁts
m
1H =  1/4.  Together  with  period-1  output  level  qS1L for  the
ow-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  the  period-1  output  given  in  Eq.  (1)  forms
art  of  the  separating  equilibrium  if  the  corresponding
P
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ncentive-compatibility  conditions  are  satisﬁed.  In  sum,  in
eriod  1  the  government  solves  the  following  problem:
max  T1
s.t.
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1  −  c  −  qS1L)qS1L +  m2L −  T∗2L ≥  m1L +  m2L −  T∗2H
(1  −  qS1L)qS1L +  m2H −  T∗2L ≤  m1H +  m2H −  T∗2H
T1 ≤  min{1H(qS1H),  1L(qm1L)}
(2)
here,  by  virtue  of  Lemma  1,  T∗2L =  m2L and  T∗2H =  m2H.  The
rst  restriction  in  Eq.  (2)  is  a  self-selection  constraint,  which
tates  that  a  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  in  period  1,  would  prefer  to
roduce  output  qS1L (a  level  that  may  differ  from  the  proﬁt-
aximizing  amount)  and  to  be  perceived  by  the  government
s  a  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  rather  than  as  a  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  by  pro-
ucing  an  amount  other  than  qS1L.  The  second  restriction  in
q.  (2)  is  the  incentive-compatibility  constraint  for  a  high-
roﬁt  ﬁrm,  which  states  that,  in  period  1,  a  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm
ould  prefer  to  produce  qm1H and  to  be  perceived  by  the  gov-
rnment  as  a  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  rather  than  as  a  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm
nd  be  forced  to  produce  qS1L. Finally,  the  third  restriction  in
q.  (2)  summarizes  the  participation  condition  of  both  ﬁrm
ypes.
In  the  abovementioned  separating  equilibrium,  both
ypes  of  ﬁrm  produce  in  period  1  (and  also  in  period  2).
or  this  reason,  we  call  this  situation  S2.  However,  another
ay  for  the  government  to  induce  disclosure  is  to  set  a  tax
n  period  1  (and  also  in  period  2)  that  is  only  acceptable  to
he  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm.  In  this  case,  the  period-1  output  for  the
ow-proﬁt  ﬁrm  will  be  zero,  qS1L =  0.  Once  the  government
bserves  a  positive  period-1  output,  it  infers  that  the  ﬁrm  is
f  high-proﬁt  type.  We  call  this  situation  S1.
The  solution  for  problem  (2)  and  the  possibility  of  iden-
ifying  ﬁrm  type  by  forcing  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  out  of  the
arket  is  as  follows,  where  the  superscript  2  (resp.,  1)  indi-
ates  that  both  ﬁrm  types  (resp.,  only  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm)
roduce  a  positive  output.
roposition  1.
(i)  (Separating  equilibrium  S2)  In  the  least-cost  separat-
ing  equilibrium  in  which  both  types  of  ﬁrm  produce,
the  government  charges,  in  period  1,  the  corporate  tax
TS21 =  {1  −  c[4  −  c −  2
√
c(2  −  c)]}/4  to  both  ﬁrm  types.
The  ﬁrm  thus  produces  qS21H =  1/2  if  it  is  high-proﬁt  and
qS21L =  [1  −
√
c(2  −  c)]/2  if  it  is  low-proﬁt.  The  govern-
ment’s  posterior  beliefs  are  (qS21H) =  1  and  (qS21L)  =  0.
Hence,  in  period  2,  both  taxes  and  outputs  are  as  in
Lemma  1.
ii)  (Separating  equilibrium  S1)  In  the  separating  equilib-
rium  in  which  only  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  produces  output,
the  government  charges,  in  period  1,  the  corporate
tax  TS11 =  1/4.  The  ﬁrm  thus  produces  qS11L =  q2L =  1/2
if  it  is  high-proﬁt  (and  qS11L =  0  if  it  is  low-proﬁt).  The
government’s  updated  beliefs  are  (q1 =  1/2)  =    and
(q1 /=  1/2)  =  1.  Hence,  in  period  2,  qS12H =  1/2  and
qS12L =  0.roof.  See  Appendix.
Separation  of  types  when  both  produce  is  costly  because
he  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  ﬁnds  it  optimal  to  apply  a  low-proﬁt
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pCorporate  taxes  with  unobservable  proﬁts  
ﬁrm’s  reporting  policy  under  asymmetric  information.  Thus,
to  prevent  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  from  projecting  itself  as
a  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  in  period  1  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  needs
to  produce  an  output  below  the  symmetric-information
proﬁt-maximizing  level.  This  reduces  its  gross  proﬁts5 and,
consequently,  the  corporate  tax  acceptable  to  both  ﬁrm’s
types  decreases  relative  to  the  situation  where  no  high-
proﬁt  ﬁrm  exists.  In  fact,  when  comparing  taxes  in  both
information  contexts,  it  follows  that  TS21 <  T
∗
1 ,  i.e.,  the  gov-
ernment  reduces  period-1  corporate  tax  as  regards  that
expectedly  imposed  in  a  symmetric  information  context.
This  period-1  tax  reduction  amounts  to:
TS21 −  T∗1 =  −
c[2 −  2
√
c(2  −  c)  +  (2  −  c)]
4
. (3)
The  presence  of  a  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  beneﬁts  the  high-proﬁt
ﬁrm  because  the  latter  obtains  net  proﬁts  as  follows:
S21H −  TS21 =
c[4  −  c  −  2
√
c(2  −  c)]
4
(4)
This  represents  its  informational  rent  in  period  1  (infor-
mational  rent  at  the  top).  The  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  on  the  other
hand,  obtains  no  informational  rent,  i.e.,  S21L −  TS21 =  0  (no
informational  rent  at  the  bottom).  In  sum,  the  government
faces  a  trade-off.  For  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  to  accept  paying
the  proposed  period-1  tax,  the  government  needs  to  pro-
vide  an  informational  rent  to  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  in  period
1;  in  contrast,  the  government  appropriates  all  proﬁts  for
period  2,  irrespective  of  ﬁrm  type.  In  separating  equilib-
rium,  in  sum,  time-increasing  taxation  would  be  observed
as  information  evolved  from  asymmetric  to  symmetric.
Also  costly  is  the  situation  in  which  the  government  sets
corporate  tax  as  TS11 =  1/4  in  period  1  and  identiﬁes  the  high-
proﬁt  ﬁrm  as  accepting  this  tax  and  consequently  producing.
In  fact,  the  government  does  not  have  to  grant  informational
rent  to  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  in  either  period  1  or  2,  but  at  the
cost  of  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  not  producing  in  either  period.
Depending  on  the  government’s  prior  probability  assess-
ment  concerning  ﬁrm  type,  will  choose  the  corporate  tax
that  maximizes  tax  revenue.  This  is  formally  described  as
follows.
Proposition  2.  Given  the  value  of  parameter  c,  let
us  deﬁne  2 =  2[1  −  3c  +  c2 +  c
√
c(2  −  c)]/(2  −  2c  +  c2),
where  0  <  2 <  1  for  all  c.  Then:
(i)  If    ∈  (0,  2),  the  government  prefers  to  identify  the
type  of  the  ﬁrm  by  making  both  produce  different  out-
puts  in  period  1  (S2).
(ii)  If    ∈  (2, 1),  the  government  prefers  to  identify  the
type  of  the  ﬁrm  by  making  both  produce  different
outputs  in  period  1  and,  particularly,  by  forcing  the  low-
proﬁt  type  dropping  out  of  the  market  (S1).
5 That is, in spite of the tax being lump-sum, the fact that they
are charged in a context of asymmetric information----as opposed
to symmetric information----leads to a productive distortion for the
low-proﬁt ﬁrm in period 1, with a reduction in output amounting to
qS21L − q∗1L = [c − 2
√
c(2 − c)]/2.
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igure  1  The  preference  of  a  revenue-raising  government
egarding  separating  equilibria.
The  result  of  Proposition  2  is  very  intuitive.  Given  the
alue  of  parameter  c,  when  the  probability  of  the  ﬁrm  being
igh-proﬁt  is  sufﬁciently  low,  the  government  opts  to  main-
ain  both  types  of  ﬁrm  producing.  Otherwise,  it  prefers  not
o  grant  informational  rent  to  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  but  at  the
ost  of  forcing  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  to  exit  the  market.  This
esult  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  1.
.2.  Perfect  Bayesian  pooling  equilibrium
hen  both  types  of  ﬁrm  produce  the  same  output  in  period
,  the  tax-signalling  game  proceeds  as  follows.
eriod  1.  After  Nature  has  chosen  the  ﬁrm’s  type,  the  gov-
rnment  sets  the  same  corporate  tax  TP1 (the  P  superscript
enotes  pooling)  for  both  types.  In  period  1,  both  ﬁrm  types
roduce  the  same  output  level,  q1H =  q1L =  qP1 ,  from  which
o  additional  information  concerning  tax-paying  potential
an  be  inferred.
eriod  2.  The  government  continues  to  use    as  its  prob-
bility  assessment  that  the  ﬁrm  is  high-proﬁt.  Thus,  the
overnment  continues  to  announce  and  commit  to  the  same
orporate  tax  for  both  ﬁrm  types,  which  equals  the  tax  pre-
iously  applied  in  period  1,  namely,  TP2 =  TP1 .
Only  one  corporate  tax  level  can  form  part  of  the  pooling
quilibrium  in  period  1,  namely,  TP1 =  (1  −  c)2/4,  charged  in
eriod  1  (and  also  in  period  2).  Both  ﬁrm  types  accept  the
ax  and  produce  qP1 =  (1  −  c)/2  in  period  1.  This  equilibrium
s  supported  by  the  government’s  beliefs  (q1 =  qP1 )  =  
nd  (q1 /=  qP1 ) =  1,  in  which  case  TP2 =  1/4.  This  is  formally
escribed  as  follows.
roposition  3.  In  the  pooling  equilibrium,  the  government
harges  corporate  tax  TPt =  (1  −  c)2/4  to  both  ﬁrm  types
n  each  period  t.  Both  ﬁrm  types  produce  qP1L =  qP1H =  qP1 =
1  −  c)/2  in  period  1.  The  government’s  updated  beliefs  are
(qP1 )  =    and  (q1 /=  qP1 )  =  1.  Hence,  in  period  2  the  ﬁrm’s
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utput  is  qP2H =  1/2  if  it  is  high-proﬁt  and  qP2L =  (1  −  c)/2  if
t  is  low-proﬁt.
However,  the  disadvantage  of  this  equilibrium  to  the  gov-
rnment  is  that  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  obtains  informational
ent  in  each  period,  amounting  to  c(1  −  c)/2  in  period  1  and
(2  −  c)/4  in  period  2.6
.3.  To  induce  or  not  to  induce  information
isclosure?
egarding  period  2,  the  government  always  prefers  the
axed  ﬁrm  to  disclose  information  because  the  government’s
evenue  is  such  that  TS22 =  T∗2 >  TP2 .  This  is  due  to  the  fact
hat  no  informational  rent  in  this  period  is  granted  to  the
igh-proﬁt  ﬁrm----as  happens  when  asymmetric  information
revails  in  the  pooling  equilibrium.  In  contrast,  when  the
rm  is  induced  to  disclose  rather  than  withhold  informa-
ion,  period-1  tax  is  lower,  i.e.,  TS21 <  T
P
1 <  T
S1
1 .  Taking  both
eriods  into  account,  the  result  of  Proposition  4  holds.
roposition  4.  For  a  given  value  of  parameter  c,  let  us
eﬁne  1 =  2[1  −
√
c(2  −  c)]/(2  −  c),  and  2 =  2[1  −  3c  +
2 +  c
√
c(2  −  c)]/(2  −  2c  +  c2),  where  0  <  1 <  1,  0  <  2 <
,  and  1 <  2 for  all  c.  The  government’s  behaviour  under
symmetric  information  depending  on  its  prior  probability
ssessment    is  as  follows:
(i)  If    ∈  (0,  1),  the  corporate  tax  TP1 is  charged  to  both
types  of  ﬁrms  in  period  1  (and  also  in  period  2)  and
the  private  information  is  not  disclosed.  The  high-proﬁt
ﬁrm  thus  obtains  an  informational  rent  in  both  periods.
(ii)  If    ∈  (1,  2),  the  corporate  tax  TS21 is  charged  to  both
types  of  ﬁrm  in  period  1  and  induces  the  ﬁrm  to  dis-
close  its  information.  The  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  thus  obtains
an  informational  rent  in  period  1,  but  not  in  period  2.
iii)  If    ∈  (2, 1),  the  corporate  tax  TS11 is  charged  to  both
types  of  ﬁrms  in  period  1  (and  also  in  period  2).  Infor-
mation  is  disclosed  because  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  does  not
produce.  The  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  does  not  obtain  informa-
tional  rent  in  either  period  1  or  in  period  2.
roof.  See  Appendix.
Proposition  4  (i)  states  that,  given  the  earnings  of  the
ow-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  if  there  is  a  small  enough  ratio  of  high-
roﬁt  ﬁrms  the  government  prefers  to  renounce  identifying
rm  type  because  separation  would  imply  granting  too  much
nformational  rent  to  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm.  Instead,  the  gov-
rnment  reduces  corporate  tax  in  each  period  compared
6 The period-1 informational rent would be even greater in the
ase of a naïve government unable to observe the period-1 output
f the ﬁrm (or the market price of the good). In this case, the gov-
rnment would choose the tax TPt = (1 − c)2/4 in each production
eriod and the high-proﬁt ﬁrm would produce q1H = 1/2 in period
 rather than produce the same quantity as the low-proﬁt ﬁrm,
1L = q1H = qP = (1 − c)2/2. As a result, the period-1 informational
ent would amount to c(2 − c)/2. In sum, both the ﬁrm and con-
umers are better off if the government cannot observe the ﬁrm’s
eriod-1 output.
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rigure  2  The  preference  of  a  revenue-raising  government
egarding  identifying  ﬁrm  type  or  not.
o  the  tax  set  under  a  symmetric  information  scenario,
P
t −  T∗t =  −c(2  −  c)/4  <  0,  t  =  1,  2.  Hence,  both  ﬁrm  types
an  produce  and  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  receives,  as  informa-
ional  rent,  c(1  −  c)/2  in  period  1  and  c(2  −  c)/4  in  period
.  In  contrast,  Proposition  4  (ii)  states  that  if  the  ratio  of
ighly  proﬁtable  ﬁrms  is  moderate,  the  government  imposes
2,  whereby  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  obtains  an  informational
ent  in  period  1  but  not  in  period  2.  Finally,  Proposition  4
iii)  states  that  when  the  ratio  of  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms  is  high
nough,  the  government  charges  such  a  high  tax  in  each
eriod  that  it  is  only  acceptable  to  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  (the
ow-proﬁt  ﬁrm  refuses  to  pay).  This  high  tax  means  that
he  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  receives  no  informational  rent.  This  is
he  S1  situation,  where  per-period  corporate  tax  is  well
bove  that  expectedly  set  under  symmetric  information,
S1
t −  T∗t =  (1  −  )c(2  −  c)/4  >  0,  t  =  1,  2.  This  is  because
er-period  output  diminishes  relative  to  per-period  out-
ut  as  expected  under  symmetric  information,  qS1t −  q∗t =
(1  −  )(1  −  c)/2  <  0;  hence,  the  price  of  the  good  to  con-
umers  increases.
This  result  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  2.
Meanwhile,  the  taxed  ﬁrm  would  prefer  the  government
o  choose  pooling  equilibrium  rather  than  S1  or  S2,  because
ts  informational  rents  over  both  periods,  IRP =  c(4  −  3c)/4,
RS2 =  c[4  −  c  −  2
√
c(2  −  c)]/4  and  IRS1 =  0,  are  such  that
RP >  IRS2.  Finally,  the  government  obtains  less  revenue
nder  asymmetric  information  than  under  symmetric  infor-
ation,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  it  induces  the  taxed
rm  to  disclose  its  private  information,  namely,  TS2 <  T∗,
S1 <  T∗,  TS1 <  T∗ and  TP <  T∗.
. Welfare
he  analysis  so  far  has  examined  the  government’s  incen-
ives  to  induce  or  not  information  disclosure.  Welfare
mplications  of  such  behaviour  are  now  examined  in  order
o  ascertain  whether  or  not  the  incentives  of  a revenue-
aising  government  are  aligned  with  social  interests.  To
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this  end,  (expected)  welfare  is  deﬁned  as  the  un-weighted
sum  of  consumer  surplus,  the  ﬁrm’s  informational  rents  and
government-collected  tax  revenue.  Consumers  are  assumed
to  have  the  same  prior  probability  assessment  as  the  gov-
ernment  regarding  the  ﬁrm’s  potential  to  make  proﬁt  and
pay  taxes.
Proposition  5.
(i)  If  a  revenue-raising  government  induces  the  taxed  ﬁrm
to  disclose  its  information,  then  WS2 <  W ∗ in  the  region
where  both  types  of  ﬁrm  produce  a  positive  output,
and  WS1 <  W ∗ when  only  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  produces
a  positive  output.
(ii)  If  the  government  chooses  not  to  induce  the  taxed  ﬁrm
to  disclose  its  information,  social  welfare  is  such  that
WP <  W ∗.
Proof.  See  Appendix.
When  the  ﬁrm  discloses  information,  its  period-1  output
is  lower  than  that  prevailing  in  a  symmetric-information  sce-
nario.  Thus,  consumers  pay  more  for  the  good  in  this  period
(lump-sum  corporate  taxes  cause  inﬂation  when  information
is  asymmetric  as  opposed  to  symmetric)  and  the  consumer
surplus  decreases.  In  addition,  expected  proﬁts  (some  going
to  the  government  as  tax  revenue  and  some  retained  by  the
high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  as  informational  rent)  also  decrease  rela-
tive  to  what  happens  in  a  symmetric-information  context.
Taking  into  account  the  welfare  level  in  period  2  and  that
welfare  distribution  between  the  government,  the  ﬁrm  and
consumers  is  as  under  symmetric  information,  the  result
WS2 <  W ∗ holds.  In  contrast,  when  S1  prevails  in  period  2
as  well  as  period  1,  ﬁrm  output  is  lower  than  under  symmet-
ric  information,  consumers  have  to  pay  a  higher  price  for
goods  and  social  welfare  is  decreased.
If  pooling  equilibrium  prevails,  in  period  1  the  ﬁrm’s  out-
put  decreases  relative  to  that  expected  under  symmetric
information,  resulting  in  a  lower  welfare  level.  In  period
2  the  ﬁrm  produces  the  same  output  as  expected  under
symmetric  information,  so  welfare  remains  the  same.  How-
ever,  welfare  distribution  among  players  shifts  relative  to
the  distribution  in  the  symmetric  information  scenario.
In  sum,  although  government  tax  set  in  both  symmetric
and  asymmetric  information  contexts  is  a  lump-sum  tax,  the
fact  that  the  good’s  expected  price  is  higher  in  the  latter
context  leads  to  lower  social  welfare  in  the  former  context,
regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  information  is  disclosed.
Welfare  outcome  under  asymmetric  information  is  now
compared  as  a  function  of  the  government’s  behaviour  in
maximizing  its  revenue,  rendering  the  following  proposition.
Proposition  6.  For  each  value  of  parameter  c  a
prior  probability  assessment  3 exists,  3 =  [2c2 +  (2  −
4c)
√
c(2  −  c)]/[2c  +  3c2 +  (2  −  4c)
√
c(2  −  c)],  where  0  <
3 <  1,  for  all  c,  for  which  the  following  hold:(i)  If    ∈  (3,  1),  social  welfare  is  maximized  when  the  ﬁrm
discloses  its  information  (in  S2).
(ii)  If    ∈  (0,  3),  social  welfare  is  maximized  when  the  ﬁrm
does  not  disclose  its  information.
ﬁ
g
v
migure  3  Equilibrium  that  would  maximize  expected  social
elfare.
roof.  See  Appendix.
The  content  of  Proposition  6  may  be  illustrated  in  Fig.  3.
The  tax-inducing  S1  is  not  socially  desirable,  since  it  is
ominated  by  the  tax  that  induces  S2.  In  fact,  the  low-proﬁt
rm  produces  no  output  in  S1,  so  the  distortion  caused  by
hat  ﬁrm  in  period  1  is  greater  than  in  S2,  where  this  dis-
ortion  also  emerges.  Thus,  in  each  period  the  price  paid  by
onsumers  is  higher  in  S1  than  in  S2,  and  social  welfare  is
onsequently  lower  in  S1.
Likewise,  when  comparing  S2  and  pooling  equilibrium,
nducing  separation  is  only  socially  efﬁcient  when----given  the
arnings  of  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm----there  is  a sufﬁciently  high
atio  of  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms.  The  socially  optimal  outcome  in
eriod  2  is  that  there  is  separation,  because  complete  infor-
ation  is  restored.  On  the  other  hand,  the  output  distortion
n  period  1  that  leads  to  separation,  and  hence  reduces
elfare,  is  more  pronounced  in  separating  than  in  pooling
quilibrium.  Overall,  the  welfare  increase  in  period  2 caused
y  S2  relative  to  pooling  equilibrium  outweighs  the  welfare
eduction  in  period  1.
Bearing  in  mind  the  ratio  of  high-proﬁt  ﬁrms,  if  the  proﬁts
f  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  are  not  very  small,  a  large  period-
 output  reduction  is  required  to  separate  the  latter  from
he  former.  The  government  thus  sets  a  very  small  tax  in
eriod  1  so  that  it  is  acceptable  to  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  but
his  makes  informational  rent  very  large  for  the  high-proﬁt
rm.  In  this  case,  no  separation  is  socially  preferable.  The
pposite  holds  when  the  number  of  low-proﬁt  ﬁrms  is  small
Fig.  4)
Thus,  a  revenue-maximizing  government  that  leads  the
axed  ﬁrm  not  to  induce  disclosure  in  also  maximizes  social
elfare  in  all  the  region  of  the  pooling  equilibrium.  The
overnment’s  behaviour  also  maximizes  aggregate  welfare
hen  it  encourages,  trough  separating  equilibrium  S2,  the
rm  to  reveal  its  information.  However,  in  this  case  the
overnment  and  social  objectives  are  only  coupled  in  a
ery  small  separating  equilibrium  region.  Finally,  a  tax-
aximizing  government  that  chooses  to  induce  ﬁrm’s  types
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Pigure  4  The  revenue-raising  government’s  alignment  and
on-alignment  with  social  welfare.
eparation  does  not  maximize  social  welfare  in  the  entire
1  separating  equilibrium  region  as  well  as  in  most  of  the  S2
eparating  equilibrium  region.
. Conclusions
his  paper  examines  the  behaviour  of  a  revenue-raising  gov-
rnment  when  charging  corporate  taxes  to  a  ﬁrm  better
nformed  than  the  government  concerning  its  proﬁtability
nd,  hence,  its  tax-paying  potential.  In  a  two-period  sig-
alling  model  in  which  the  government  interacts  with  a
ingle  ﬁrm,  the  government’s  tax  policy  of  inducing  the  ﬁrm
o  disclose  its  information  is  found  to  be  generally  desirable
n  order  to  maximize  revenue.
In  particular,  when  the  prior  probability  assessment  of  the
overnment  about  having  a  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  is  high  enough,
he  government  prefers  the  ﬁrm  to  disclose  its  private  infor-
ation,  although  the  cost  is  that  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  does  not
roduce  at  all  and  no  taxes  from  this  ﬁrm  are  collected.  In
his  case,  the  government  saves  the  informational  rent  to
he  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  in  period  2  as  well  as  in  period  1.  The
isclosure  approach  is  also  the  best  policy  for  the  govern-
ent  when,  given  the  earnings  of  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm,  the
overnment’s  prior  probability  assessment  that  the  ﬁrm  has
 high  tax-paying  potential  is  moderate.  In  this  case,  the  gov-
rnment  reduces  period-1  tax  relative  to  that  which  would
xpectedly  be  paid  under  symmetric  information.  The  gov-
rnment  is  thus  obliged  to  grant  an  informational  rent  to
he  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm  in  period  1;  however,  the  restoration  of
omplete  information  means  that,  in  period  2,  tax  revenue
s  increased  to  the  point  that  informational  rent  is  reduced
o  zero.  Finally,  if  the  government’s  prior  probability  assess-
ent  is  low  enough,  the  government  prefers  not  to  identify
he  ﬁrm  type  but  prefers  instead  to  set  a  period-1  corpo-
ate  tax  that  reduces  this  period’s  informational  rent  to  the
igh-proﬁt  ﬁrm  relative  to  separation,  although  the  infor-
ational  rent  persists  in  period  2  (and  even  increases  with
espect  to  period  1).M.  Antelo
From  a social  viewpoint,  the  strategy  of  a  revenue-
aising  government  in  this  signalling  context  is  generally  not
ligned  with  social  interests,  especially  when  the  govern-
ent  induces  separation,  as  this  leads  to  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm
xiting  the  market.  Yet  it  is  socially  desirable  to  have  sep-
ration  with  both  ﬁrm  types  producing,  as  consumer  prices
ould  be  lower  in  both  periods.  Likewise,  when  government-
nduced  separation  results  in  positive  output  in  period  1  for
oth  ﬁrm  types,  a  region  of  parameters  exists  in  which  non-
isclosure  of  information  is  socially  desirable,  given  that,
n  welfare  terms,  disclosure  is  too  costly  relative  to  non-
isclosure.
As  Klinger  and  McFate  (2013)  pointed  out  ‘‘companies
in  the  U.S.)  can  make  proﬁts,  pay  taxes  on  those  proﬁts,
nd  create  jobs.  Ensuring  that  all  corporations  pay  taxes  on
heir  proﬁts  will  provide  the  national  government  with  the
evenue  needed  to  invest  in  modernizing  the  transportation,
nformation,  communications,  and  energy  infrastructure  the
conomy  needs  to  grow.  Demanding  that  corporate  actors
hat  beneﬁt  from  operating  in  America  help  pay  for  the
ublic  systems  that  enable  their  success  will  ensure  future
enerations  of  Americans  are  able  to  compete  in  the  global
conomy  and  thrive’’  (p.  19).  And  the  role  of  obtaining  the
ecessary  information  is  crucial  to  that  end.
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ppendix.
roof  of  Proposition  2.
(i)  Separating  equilibrium  S1.  The  incentive-compatibility
conditions  of  the  problem  stated  in  (3)  particularize  in
(1  −  c  −  qS1L)qS1L ≥
(1  −  c)2
4
− c(2  −  c)
4
(A1)
and
(1  −  qS1L)qS1L +
c(2  −  c)
4
≤ 1
4
,  (A2)
respectively.  The  two  roots  that  solve  inequality  (A1)
taken  as  an  equality  are  r+,− =  [1  −  c ±
√
(2  −  c)c]/2,
so  inequality  (A1)  is  satisﬁed  whenever  qS1L ∈  [r−,  r+].
On  the  other  hand,  the  two  roots  that  solve  inequal-
ity  (A2)  as  an  equality  are  s+,− =  [1  ±
√
c(2  −  c)]/2,
inequality  (A2)  is  satisﬁed  whenever  qS1L ∈  [0,  s−]  ∪
[s+,  ∞].  Taking  into  account  that  r− <  s−, any  output
level  qS1L ∈  [r−,  s−] reveals  that  the  ﬁrm  is  low-proﬁt.
Bearing  in  mind  that  s− <  (1  −  c)/2  ≡  qm1L,  we  conclude
that,  of  these  output  levels,  the  least  costly  for  the
government  is  qS1L =  s−.  In  sum,  the  period-1  outputs
that  form  part  of  the  separating  equilibrium  are  qS1L =
[1  −
√
c(2  −  c)]/2  for  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  and  qm1H =  1/2
for  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm.  Finally,  of  the  two  corporate
taxes  that  the  government  may  set  in  t  =  1,  namely
TS1 =  S1L or  TS1 =  S1H,  the  tax  that  allows  both  ﬁrm  types
to  take  part  in  the  tax  game  is  TS1 =  S1L.  This  tax  leads
the  incentive-compatibility  constraint  for  the  low-proﬁt
(P
a
R
A
B
BCorporate  taxes  with  unobservable  proﬁts  
ﬁrm  to  be  binding,  whereas  that  of  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm
is  not  binding  and  this  ﬁrm  consequently  may  obtain
informational  rent.
(ii)  Separating  equilibrium  S1.  This  arises  when  the  govern-
ment  charges  the  tax  TS1 =  S1H to  both  types  of  ﬁrm  in
period  1.  It  is  clear  that  the  low-proﬁt  ﬁrm  would  reject
this  tax,  so  the  only  ﬁrm  that  accepts  to  pay  the  tax  and
produces  would  be  the  high-proﬁt  ﬁrm.  Full  information
is  thus  restored  in  period  2.
Proof  of  Proposition  4.  When  tax  revenue  over  two  periods
in  S2  equilibrium  and  pooling  equilibrium  are  compared,  it
follows  that  TS21 −  TP1 =  −c[1  −
√
c(2  −  c)]/2  <  0,  whereas
TS22 −  TP2 =  c(2  −  c)/4  >  0.  Overall
TS2 −  TP =    − 2[1  −
√
c(2  −  c)]
2  −  c , (A3)
i.e.,  tax  revenue  under  S2  equilibrium  is  higher  (lower)
than  under  pooling  equilibrium  whenever  the  government’s
prior  belief  regarding  the  ﬁrm  as  high-proﬁt  is  large  (small)
enough.  On  the  other  hand,  when  tax  revenue  under  S1
equilibrium  and  pooling  equilibrium  are  compared,  we
have  TS11 −  TP1 =  [  −  (1  −  c)2]/4  >  0  and  TS12 −  TP2 =  [  −
(1  −  c)2]/4  >  0,  by  which
TS1 −  TP =   −  (1  −  c)
2
2
.  (A4)
Likewise,  when  tax  revenue  under  S2  equilibrium  and
S1  equilibrium  are  compared,  it  holds  that  TS21 −  TS11 =  [1  −
  −  c(4  −  c  −  2
√
c(2  −  c)]/4,  which  may  be  positive  or  nega-
tive,  whereas  T∗2 −  TS12 =  (1  −  )(1  −  c)2/4  >  0.  Taking  both
periods  into  account,  it  follows  that
TS2 −  TS1 =    − 2[1  −  3c  +  c
2 +  c
√
c(2  −  c)]
2  −  2c  +  c2 .  (A5)
Finally,  considering  (A3)--(A5)  renders  the  result  of  the
proposition.
Proof  of  Proposition  5.
(a)  If  the  government  behaves  in  such  a  way  that  the  ﬁrm’s
private  information  is  fully  transmitted  through  sepa-
rating  equilibrium  S2  (see  Proposition  1  and  Fig.  3),
expected  consumer  surplus  in  period  2  amounts  to
CS∗2 =  [1  −  2(1  −  )c  +  (1  −  )c2]/8,  which,  taking  tax
revenue  into  account,  leads  to
W ∗2 =  CS∗2 +  T∗2 =
3
8
[1  −  2(1  −  )c  +  (1  −  )c2]  (A6)
as  period-2  welfare.  On  the  other  hand,  period-1  wel-
fare  amounts  to
WS21 =  CSS21 +  TS21 +  IRS21H
= 1
2
⎡
⎣1
4
+ (1  −  )
(
1  −
√
c(2  −  c)
2
)2⎤⎦
1 √+
4
{1  −  c[4  −  c  −  2 c(2  −  c)]}
+  c[4 −  c  −  2
√
c(2  −  c)]
4
,  (A7)
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where  IR  stands  for  informational  rent.  From  (A6)  and
(A7), welfare  level  over  both  periods  amounts  to
WS2 =  WS21 +  W ∗2 =
1
4
{[3  −
√
c(2  −  c)][1 −  2(1  −  )c]
+  2(1  −  )c2 +  
√
c(2  −  c)}.  (A8)
Taking  into  account  that  WS22 =  W ∗2 ,  welfare  compar-
ison  under  separating  equilibrium  S2  and  equilibrium  of
symmetric  information  is  reduced  to  welfare  compar-
ison  in  period  1.  Hence,  comparison  of  (A6)  and  (A7)
renders  the  result  stated  in  part  (a)  of  the  proposition.
b)  When  the  government  leads  the  taxed  ﬁrm  not  to
disclose  its  private  information  through  period-1  out-
put  that  forms  part  of  the  pooling  equilibrium  (see
Proposition  2  and  Figure  3),  expected  welfare  in  period
1  is
WP1 =  CSP1 +  TP1 +  IRP1H =
1
2
(
1  −  c
2
)2
+
(
1  −  c
2
)2
+ 1
2
c(1  −  c)  = 3
8
(1  −  c)2 + 1
2
c(1  −  c)  (A9)
and  in  period  2 is
WP2 =  CSP2 +  TP2 +  IRP2H =
1
2
[

1
4
+ (1  −  ) (1  −  c)
2
4
]
+ (1  −  c)
2
4
+  c(2 −  c)
4
= 3
8
[1  −  (1  −  )c(2  −  c)].
(A10)
As  a  result,  welfare  over  both  periods  amounts  to
WP = 1
8
[6(1  −  c)2 +  c(10  −  7c)].  (A11)
Likewise,  in  S1  equilibrium,  expected  welfare  in
each  period  t,  t  =  1,2,  amounts  to  WS1t =  CSS1t +  TS1t =
1
2
(
1
2
)2 +  ( 12)2 = 32( 12)2,  whereby  welfare  over  both
periods  is  given  by
WS1 = 3
4
.  (A12)
Finally,  comparing  (A6),  (A11)  and  (A12)  allows  us  to
obtain  the  result  stated  in  part  (b)  of  the  proposition.
roof  of  Proposition  6.  Taking  (A8),  (A11)  and  (A12)  into
ccount  proves  the  result  of  the  proposition.
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